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Aquaculture expansion is a political priority in Norway, despite simmering conflicts, and
competing claims.We expand on this hypothesis and analyze the Norwegian governance
system by adding stakeholder theory in case of a simulated model of the effects of
municipal coastal zone planning in the municipality of Frøya, Norway. One cannot analyze
the governance system in Norway without fully comprehending the perspectives of the
stakeholders involved. Different stakeholders will react and respond differently and have
conflicting presumptions basing their actions toward the planning process for coastal
areas. They will also have different levels of power and abilities to influence the system.
The article presents the interdisciplinary, first generation development of an agent based
simulation model that mimics the outcomes of coastal zone planning for a stakeholder
groups, the commercial fishers and the aquaculture industry, based on qualitative input
from legislation, regulations, and stakeholder workshops. We proceed with verifying the
applicability of this simulator in light of the key actors involved, namely the commercial
fishers. We found that the simulator had two outcomes for the commercial fishers that
were consistently recurring, namely “collapse” and “stability,” based on the simulated
occurrences of complaints by the stakeholders, with the latter being the de facto
perceptions of actuality by the commercial fishers. Using stakeholder theory, we argue
that the aquaculture industry’s role has the saliency of an Important Stakeholder in
Frøya has steered the commercial fishers, who has the role of Dependent Stakeholders
according to stakeholder theory, to no longer see any legitimacy in the process in that
their complaints were never upheld because of their lack of the attribute Power.
Keywords: fisheries, aquaculture, stakeholder, power, simulation, interdisciplinary, area planning, coastal zone
management
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INTRODUCTION
Competing claims to coastal waters are nothing new (Buanes
et al., 2005; Young et al., 2007; Douvere, 2008; Meiner, 2010;
Tiller et al., 2012, 2013, 2014). A traditional use of coastal areas
has been the harvest of fish for food consumption, and this
continues to be an important activity globally. Research reports
show, however, that marine fish stocks have continued to decline
and that in 2011, 61.3% were fully utilized and could no longer
be harvested at a biologically sustainable level (FAO, 2014b). If
pressure on wild stocks increases—driven for example by the
increasing demand for seafood from big emerging economies
with large populations like India and China—serious threats to
global food security could result (Delgado et al., 2003; Fu et al.,
2012). The primary method of the past several decades for the
reduction in the rate of fishing pressure on wild stocks has
been to expand the aquaculture industry for all farmed species,
from shrimp to Atlantic salmon1 (Abdallah and Sumaila, 2007;
Garcia and Rosenberg, 2010; van Vliet et al., 2010; Islam, 2014).
This expansion of the aquaculture industry, however, can have
an effect on the trade of the commercial fishers in countries
with an interest in exploiting ecosystem services provided by
the coastal zone. In Norway, 64% of the municipalities border
directly on coastal waters (The Norwegian Mapping Authority,
2014). Both commercial fishers and the aquaculture industry
are closely involved in the integrated coastal zone management
process here. This is especially true for the local municipal coastal
area planning procedures that in fact allocate marine areas for
commercial purposes to different stakeholder groups, whether it
is for capture fishing, crabbing, aquaculture, tourism, or other.
The involvement in the process is therefore critical in order for
commercial fisheries to have their interests taken into account
and their primary fishing areas put on the official municipal
maps to avoid the placement of competing claims there. It is
similarly important for the aquaculture industry to ascertain that
suitable areas with enough flexibility to adapt to future changes
in national framework policies, as long as allowing for growth of
the industry, are taken into account.
In the current article the focus is on the commercial fishers,
however, and their will to provide municipal coastal planning
authorities with said information regarding their fisheries. We
also want to explore their perceptions of the importance thereof.
In one case, we could expect fishers to either over-report areas of
great fishing, in order to obtain more marine areas that would
prohibit aquaculture facilities in the proximity of their fishing
spots. In another case, we could also expect them to under-report
it, as revealing these fishing spots could encourage other fishers
to encroach on their preferred fishing areas, which might have
been a long kept family secret. In light of this, the following
article provides insight to illuminate this dual expectation,
using an innovative and interdisciplinary process of combining
expertise in political science with the logical presumptions of
computer science, and developing a first generation multi-agent
1The aquaculture industry is defined in the current article as the farming of
Atlantic Salmon (Salmo salar) within the framework of the production process of
placing produced smolts in sea cages for saltwater growing until the fish reaches
the size that is suitable for market purposes.
simulator based on qualitative data from (1) the established
regulatory facts related to the Norwegian Planning and Building
Act and (2) results from a workshop with fishers in 2012.
What we aim to do is to test both expectations and explore
whether the simulated coastal planning process and hearings
regarding the industry application for localities conforms to
real life stakeholder perceptions of the same issues. In doing
so, we will first provide a background section about fishing
and aquaculture in Norway. This is followed by the theories
that will frame our study, and the methods used to develop
the Agent-Based simulations as well as how the stakeholders
were selected for participation in the study. Finally, we will
present the results from the stakeholder verification session
in 2014.
BACKGROUND
Fishing and Aquaculture in Norway and
Frøya
TheNorwegian coast has long been influenced by human activity,
and has historically been of great significance for the Norwegian
society. After the Second World War, though, rationalization
and modernization of the commercial fishing industry and
the fishing vessel-structure was characterized by conflicts and
there were natural resistance against readjustments of these
fisheries in coastal communities, including Frøya. The fishing
industry had prior to this experienced great expansion and there
were dramatic increases in production of different commercial
species and highly developed fish-products, even resulting in
the employment of women several places (Christensen, 2014).
By 1950, there were in fact more than 1500 fishers on this
island community (Foss and Hammer, 1997), as compared with
only 103 fishers that today have fishing as their main source of
income (Directorate of Fisheries, 2014c). Increased efficiency and
better technology, however, made the fishing vessels more mobile
and the total catch of some species soon neared collapse (e.g.,
Norwegian herring, smelt, and coastal cod, Ibid), in line with
the global experience at the time. In the coastal communities
where the fisheries earlier had an important role, new and
alternative businesses, including aquaculture, soon took over
for this now declining industry. The process resulted in strong
deconstruction of the fishing industry both at sea as well as on
land, as measured by employment. In both Frøya and Hitra,
the neighboring archipelago, the significant restructuring in both
commercial fishing and agriculture caused a population loss of
38% from 1964 to 1995 (Van auken and Fredrik Rye, 2011;
Statistics Norway, 2013).
The solution for many coastal communities, including Frøya,
became a further expansion of the up-and-coming aquaculture
industry. Norway has seen enormous aquaculture growth since
the inception of the industry after this period and is currently
the world leader in the production and export of farmed salmon
(FAO, 2014a). By the 1970’s the industry had expanded globally
and has had exponential growth ever since, with a focus on
high value species with a high export demand (FAO Fisheries
and Aquaculture Department., 2010). The industry has also
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been critical in the development of spin-off industries, and
is an important contributor to the supply- and processing
industry as well in Norway (Sandberg et al., 2014). This is
of crucial importance for the life in the coastal communities,
and creates economic growth in both rural districts as well as
larger cities, which is of utmost political priority across party
lines (Regjeringen Stoltenberg II, 2005-2009; Pedersen, 2006;
Ministry of Trade Industry and Fisheries, 2014). Furthermore,
the population change in Frøya has been positive since 2008, and
was at 3.04% in 2013, with the current population being 4506
inhabitants (Statistics Norway, 2013). Frøya was also recently
ranked the 5th out of the 10 most successful rural municipalities
in Norway (Richardson et al., 2009), indicating that Frøya is one
of the municipalities that has been successful both in terms of
industrial development and in population growth. Furthermore,
value added per capita is among the highest in Norway, and
is ranked top in Trøndelag. The municipality’s largest business,
the salmon farming- and processing company SalMar, completed
and launched in 2011 an extensive construction and a huge
expansion of their new salmon-processing plant located on
Kverva, Frøya, which is Europe’s largest salmon processing plant
of its kind (Webb, 2007). It is within this framework that the
stakeholder group of commercial fisher, having declined from
1500 to only 103 with fishing as their main income, and where
the coastal areas within which their trade is dependent upon is
located.
Both stakeholder groups belong to a Norwegian governance
model of inclusion of stakeholders at all times. It is a tripartite
coalition system, with the national, regional and municipal
governments working in unison to develop area plans for both
terrestrial and marine areas in the given municipality. The
schematic in Figure 1 refers to the actual municipal area planning
process, where areas, both terrestrial andmarine, are divided into
usage areas, whether these be open access, aquaculture, pipelines,
windmills, or any other usage a given stakeholder group might
have for a given marine spatial area. Though all three level of
government are included in the governance system, it is the
municipality that has the primary responsibility to develop area
plans along the coastal zone, including areas for aquaculture.
Their job is to determine where these industries are best located,
from a socio-ecological angle. However, the regional government
(Fylkeskommunen) has a duty to assist the municipalities in this
endeavor, specifically about the goals and expectations of the
national government, though legally, they do not have the right to
impose any specific usage to any given area. However, given the
complexities of having both a planning process, as well as actual
enforcement of a variety of laws governing the areas and ventures
that are planned for in the given locations, the demands for
expertise are immense. When in addition national expectations
are expected to have an effect on the planning process, the
necessity of cooperation between levels of governance is evident,
as well as the inclusion of both stakeholders and different sectors
(Sørtrøndelag Fylkeskommune, 2010). This is because after the
planning is done, a variety of other instruments determine
whether or not an aquaculture facility is actually going into the
water in an area set aside for this in the municipality’s plans (see
Figure 2).
The first, and most critical of these instruments, is the
actual dispensation of aquaculture licenses, or permits, by the
national government, in accordance with the Aquaculture Act of
2005 (Lovdata.no, 2005). These licenses were granted with few
restrictions from 1973, when the first and temporary Aquaculture
Law was effectuated. It lasted until 1977, when all license
applications were denied while a permanent Aquaculture Law
was put in place. This law was not in place until 1981, when
the government took over the distribution of growth in the
industry with regards tomunicipalities and regions. The ordinary
licensing rounds after this time were in 1981, 1983, 1985, 1989,
2002, 2003, 2009, and 2013 (Table 1) (Holm et al., 2002; Jakobsen
et al., 2003; Lovdata.no, 2003; Sønvisen, 2003; Bjørndal and
Aaker, 2006; Fiskeri-og kystdepartementet, 2008; Gullestad et al.,
2009; Riksrevisjonen, 2012; Andreassen and Robertson, 2014;
Directorate of Fisheries, 2014b).
Once these licenses are granted, however, applications for the
location in which to place the facility must take into account
not only the area plans of the municipalities. They must also
take into account the legalities covered in the Aquaculture act.
This is because, though the municipalities may have facilitated
the process of increasing aquaculture production localities in
their area plans in a given area, the Aquaculture Act determines
whether or not it indeed can be allowed in the specific area, based
on conditions and terms in the act itself. Furthermore, in many
area plans, large marine areas are listed as multipurpose (FFFNA)
areas, which in some cases can the power back to the stakeholder
groups to affect what activities are best suited therein.
One of the conditions of the actual placing of aquaculture
facilities in the water is that other affected sectors (step 9 in
Figure 2) have given their approval decision to the application
for establishment of an aquaculture facility in the given area
where the industry suggests new ventures. The application
is also subject to rigorous municipal hearings with affected
stakeholders (step 5–6 in Figure 2), and special dispensations
from the municipal planners will have to be administered if the
actual area plans are to be sidestepped or changed. There are,
in other words, many instances in which affected stakeholders
have an opportunity to influence the government process with
regards to the allocation of areas to specific purposes in a given
municipality.
THEORY AND METHODS
Stakeholders Theory
The power of one group of stakeholders to influence policy and
management decisions is difficult to explain for many though.
The principle of stakeholder involvement is to ensure that local
stakeholders, including environmental NGOs, are involved at
all level of interest in the governance process. This is natural,
in that governments of democratic nations continuously make
laws that influence stakeholder groups by shaping and regulating
them. They are constantly faced with both the interests of
new investments that could provide job opportunities, and the
wishes of stakeholders. These stakeholders apply different levels
of power and influence over policy decisions, and some also have
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FIGURE 1 | Planning and Building Act (1985).
the opportunity to shape policy. It has been argued, though,
that stakeholders also should play a large role in determining
public policy in any given issue area. This is because it arguably
facilitates legitimacy in the process for the stakeholders, greater
satisfaction and often more innovative solutions, and thus also
compliance with legislation (Buanes et al., 2005; Young et al.,
2007; Gopnik et al., 2012).
The political culture wherein stakeholder groups maneuver,
however, is a reflection and a reinforcement of the political
context thereof. The management of stakeholders with
conflicting incentives in a given environmental circumstance is
thus critical for policy makers and companies alike, in order to
ensure that the project in question is able to move forward and
that the field of legitimate stakeholders is taken into account so
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FIGURE 2 | Municipality area planning is only the first step before an aquaculture license can be placed in the water in accordance with a given area
plan. The above figure delineates the process that the industry has to adhere to. Adapted from Osmundsen and Finne (2014).
that an environmental conflict2 can be avoided. Conflicts in these
cases arise for different reasons between different groups. It can
be due to conflicting usage of the given resources, such as a given
ocean space where fish spawn and where conditions are also
prime for the offshore farming of Atlantic Salmon. It could also
be between those who wish to use the resource and those who
wish to conserve it, such as the capture fisheries industry wanting
to harvest wild fish, and environmental organizations wanting
to preserve them or aquaculture industries wanting to place net
pens over the same marine space where the wild fish can be
harvested. It can also be a conflict between decision makers, and
those who wish a larger say in the governance process, such as
interest organizations for the affected stakeholder groups (Elias,
2008).
In light of this, stakeholder theory looks at stakeholder
possession of one or more of three relationship attributes within
this system, namely power, legitimacy, and urgency (Mitchell
et al., 1997). Accordingly, stakeholders can be classified according
2An environmental conflict is, according to the Environmental Policy and
Conflict Resolution Act of 1998 (Huemer, 2010), defined as a dispute or conflict,
disagreements, which relate to topics of the environment held in the public trust
and natural resources generally.
to their possession of one, two, or all three of these identifying
attributes. Power relates to a given stakeholder’s ability to
influence the industry in question, or the governing sector.
Legitimacy refers to the given stakeholder groups relationship
with the said industry or governing sector, and Urgency refers
to the claim the given stakeholder is putting forth, and the
degree to which it calls for its immediate attention because it
is time-sensitive and of importance to the given stakeholder. A
stakeholder is thus defined by the resultant addition of power and
legitimacy, which equals its legitimate use of power, or authority,
on the given topic.
The salience of a given stakeholder is thus the degree to
which the decision makers will give priority to claims from
different stakeholder, and rate one above another. Stakeholders
who possess two or more attributes will expect something from
the process and have a much more salient status with policy-
and decision makers than those who only possess one attribute.
Table 2 is based on a figure in Mitchell et al. (1997) and gives
numeric values to these attributes.
The least salient group of stakeholders is the Dangerous ones.
These stakeholders, though in the possession of both urgency
and power, have no political legitimacy to push decision makers,
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TABLE 1 | Overview of rounds of aquaculture license allocations by the Norwegian government after the first Aquaculture Act of 1981.
Year Number of
licenses
Notes on allocation and cage volume. Price in NOK Price differences
1981 54 43 out of 54 licenses were allocated to the area of Namdalen, and the counties of
Nordland, Troms and Finnmark. Capacity 3000m3 (cage volume)
– –
1983 100 Capacity increased to 5000m3 – –
1985 150 2000 applications; capacity 8000m3 – –
1988 – Existing facilities were given permission to expand to a capacity of 12 000m3, which
corresponds to the current (2015) 780 maximum allowed biomass (MAB) through the
conversion regulations of 2005 where 1000m3 = 65 ton MAB
– –
1989 30 Allocations were made to the two northernmost counties only; Troms and Finnmark – –
2002 40 The 10 licenses for the county of Finnmark were not sold (they were later sold through a
bidding round in 2006). Two licenses were given free of charge to Musken, the Sami
community in Tysfjord, in the county of Nordland. The fees were only for first time licensees
5 million 4 million in Troms and Finnmark
2003 50 Licenses were allocated regionally, and were given municipal belonging through
collaboration with the Fisheries Directorate
5 million 4 million in Troms and Finnmark
2009 65 5 licenses were ear-marked organic production 8 million 3 million in Finnmark
2013 45 Green licenses in three categories (includes the exchange of 35 ordinary licenses to same
green regime):
1. Group A: two northernmost counties, 10 licenses to each
2. Group B: closed bidding with prequalified applicants; 15 licenses. The average bid for
the 15 winning bids was NOK 60 477 000, with a high bid of NOK 66 million and the
lowest bid at 55 million
3. Group C: 10 licenses open for all
10 million 10 million
TABLE 2 | Stakeholder attributes and corresponding salience.
Type of Stakeholder Attribute Salience
Urgency Legitimacy Power
Dangerous 0
Demanding 1
Discretionary 2
Dormant 3
Dependent 4
Dominant 5
Important 6
but choose to do so for other reasons and sometimes using
illegal and dangerousmethods. Their salience is thus theoretically
strong, though not for legitimate reasons and policy makers
can thus not consider them highly in salience politically, since
these are often associated with illegal use of force. Ranking just
slightly higher than the dangerous stakeholders are those that are
consideredDemanding by decisionmakers. These are unable—or
unwilling—to attain neither legitimacy nor power. What they do
have are urgent claims. They are thus not considered dangerous
for the decision maker, but rather an annoyance and their claim
will therefore seldom have a very salient status. Discretionary
stakeholders on the other hand only have legitimacy. They do
not possess either a claim with an urgency associated with it
nor do they have any power to influence the decision makers
and they therefore lack the active relationship necessary to
influence a political process. In business, these stakeholders
are often recipients of Corporate Philanthropy, or Corporate
Social Responsibility, such as communities where the given
companies do business. Dormant stakeholders on the other
hand are those that have the power to impose their will, but
neither urgency nor a legitimate relationship with the decision
maker. Because of the latter, their power over the process
is not tapped into, and dormant. However, given that they
do have this power, they also have the potential to achieve
a second attribute, and thus it is a stakeholder group that
needs to be accounted for and taken into consideration by the
decision maker.
Dependent stakeholders though, are those that possess both
legitimacy and urgency, but do not have the power, neither
dormant nor awake, to push the decision makers like dominant
stakeholders do. TheDominant stakeholder therefore has to show
benevolence on these to aid them in their work toward their
goal. This is because the Dominant stakeholders belong to a
group that matters to, and demand a lot of attention from, the
decision makers in any situation. These stakeholders have more
saliency given that they possesses both power and legitimacy, and
their influence and dominant role in the governance process is
thus assured even if they have no urgent claim. In liaison with
Dependent stakeholders, they are a dominant force that decision
makers will take into account. An Important Stakeholder, though,
is one that possesses all three attributes on his own, and is a force
that decision makers will always consider, having urgency, power,
and legitimacy.
Methods
The goal of this article was to assess the will of commercial
fishers to provide municipal coastal planning authorities with
information regarding their fisheries areas, and what influenced
their willingness, or lack therof to do this. We therefore decided
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to develop a first generation Agent-Based simulator that could
simulate the effects, according to qualitative input, of either
withholding information about fishing spots to area managers
or freely sharing it with the mapping authorities. Secondly,
we wanted to explore their perceptions about whether their
involvement as a stakeholder group had enough saliency to have
an effect on the policy making process, in line with stakeholder
theory. One of the reasons for this interest was that in Frøya,
the commercial fishers were originally welcoming of aquaculture,
as represented in results from a previous workshop held with
the same group (Tiller et al., 2014). These results contradicted
the rational prediction the research group had that this group
ought to protest more often to municipal marine area plans
that threatened their fishing sites in order to avoid a competing
industry, such as that of aquaculture, from taking over the coastal
resources.
Data
For the purposes of this study, we chose an innovative and
interdisciplinary angle to this exploration, combining expertise
in political science with multi-agent systems, in developing a first
generation agent-based simulator based on qualitative data input
sourced on the governance model (Figure 1), results from an
earlier stakeholder workshop (Tiller et al., 2014), and discussions
with experts within the research group.
Development of the First-generation Agent-based
simulator
Agent-based models of human behavior and multi-agent
simulations have proven to be useful for predicting social
behavior (Davidsson, 2002). Agent-based models are used to
learn and teach about complex situations where agents influence
and are influenced by dynamic and vulnerable environments. For
example, the multiagent system in Cleland et al. (2012) simulates
fishers’interaction to cooperate and harvest resources from the
environment in different locations, and has been applied as a
teaching tool in a social setting. Another agent-based model
(Groner et al., 2013) was developed to investigate the spread
and dynamics of the sea lice infestation in salmon populations,
allowing study of effectiveness and optimal concentrations of
wrasse without environmental risk. Farmers spreading pests
through interactions were simulated (Rebaudo et al., 2011) using
a combined agent-based and cellular automaton model that
was applied as a teaching tool, aiming to increase awareness of
how the pests spread. It is obvious that individual stakeholder
agents exercise strategic thinking and decision making, and
that complex societal behavior emerges from decisions taken
by individuals. The main principle underlying such dynamic
behavior of societies is that individuals observe other agents’
behavior and change their behavior accordingly. Game theory
(GT) investigates such strategic decision- making and is able
to explain many prototypical dilemmas. However, GT has
been criticized for being unable to capture the behavior of
societies with high population. Firstly, classical GT assumes
that the agents have perfect knowledge about the other
agents in the environment, e.g., their payoffs. Secondly, it
assumes that agents behave rationally, i.e., each individual select
actions that maximize their utility. In dynamic and stochastic
environments, assumption of perfect knowledge is unrealistic,
and agents do not necessarily behave rationally. In addition,
it is not possible to know in advance which strategies are
optimal. Evolutionary game theory (EGT), on the other hand,
investigates the learning of optimal strategies, rather than
assuming that agents have sufficient information about their
environments to decide optimal actions in advance (Smith,
1982). In EGT, individuals learn how to select an optimal
behavior by imitating the strategies of the agents that receive
highest payoff. This is analogous to survival of individuals with
highest fitness in biological evolution (Axelrod and Hamilton,
1981). EGT methods has been used in environmental settings
such as the issue of culling red deer populations through
hunting, where the decisions and behaviors of land owners
depend on the behavior of their neighbors (Touza et al.,
2013).
The software written for this article is entitled
FisherSimulation, and the program was created as part of a
Master’s Thesis at NTNU applying a multi-agent system to a
real-world problem, in this case that of integrated coastal zone
management in Frøya, Norway (Svalestuen, 2014). The core
of the simulator is an evolutionary artificial neural network
that implements a learning-by-imitation mechanism, an EGT
method, where agents adopt the behavior of agents that made
best return in the preceding round. The source code for the
simulation was written in Python, following standard object-
oriented programming techniques. The platform CORMAS
was chosen for the project, since it is used for creating agent-
based simulations, especially with an ecological focus (Le Page
et al., 2012). Given that the project involves intelligent agents
(fishermen, government, municipality, aquaculture industry)
and ecological resources (fish), this is a suitable choice. For
the purposes of this study, we define “agents” as a computer
simulated variable that represented a given stakeholder group.
The simulation centered on agents that corresponded to the
stakeholders of fishermen and aquaculture owners, and was run
with 20 simulated fishermen. The overall mechanism and the
rules, the agent types and their roles, and the type of interaction
between them are designed according to the description in Tiller
et al. (2014).
The simulator was created to replicate the complaint
behaviors related to the municipal area planning process of the
stakeholders. If it weren’t able to replicate them, we wanted to
reveal why the simulated situation didn’t correspond to real life.
We also developed a municipality-agent and an agent for the
government in the simulation. In the simulation, run 10 times for
each configuration, these stakeholders interact throughmessages,
and make decisions through different mechanisms. Agents are
prompted for decisions in a set sequence of events that cycle over
and over again, simulating a large time span. Time, however, for
the purposes of this simulation, was measured in terms of coastal
planning cycles. This measure does not directly correspond to a
set number of days, months or years, though, since the coastal
planning cycles can occur with irregular intervals. The different
events that have an effect on the simulations are based on the data
from Data, and thus as follows:
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Coastal planning
This is an act that is performed by the municipality and consists
of assigning purposes to marine areas, such as fishing, tourism,
general purpose, or aquaculture, to name a few. The simulated
world we developed is divided into cells that represent areas that
are plentiful of fish resources (see Figure 3 for illustration of a
Coastal Planning output). These cells are also attractive to the
aquaculture owners, though. In the simulation, the agent “Fisher”
(20 agents are simulated) is represented with boats (numbered
means multiple fishers in the same location), and are located in
their current “home” cells. Fish quantity in each cell can be seen
by the size of the fish in the cell’s top-left corner. Aquaculture
facilities are shown as gray decagons, and the area around
them that is blocked for fishing (as well as further aquaculture
expansion) is indicated by crosses.
Initially, the simulation will allow the municipality to
reserve all slots that aren’t already used by aquaculture for
exclusive use for the purposes of industry expansion. When
reviewing the plan, the municipality therefore assigns a reserved
status to marine locations, which means they can only be
occupied by aquaculture, and are thus not freely used by
fishermen.
Hearing
During the hearing part of the simulation, the fishermen agents
review the municipal area plan and issue formal protests to the
government if there are areas among those with reserved status
that they want to protect from further aquaculture expansion.
This assumption of complaint is also based on the input from
the data selection process. The simulation sets this decision to
complain to be made on a per-cell basis by an artificial neural
FIGURE 3 | The world map organized as a grid structure.
network that relies on three input parameters: (a) how good the
fishing resource the fishermen agents currently occupy is; (b) how
good the resource threatened by aquaculture in the coastal plan
is (the area that has reserved status); and (c) the distance between
the two cells (or areas, as they would be in real life). The simulator
assumes these protests to be formal and public, so they inform
other (competing) fishermen of the location of a complaint area
in question as well, which also identifies a good fishing spot
(since we assume that it is marked on the map by a fisher at that
point). The simulator then let the agent “government” review the
complaints and decide if the plan needs to be reviewed again to
change the area from aquaculture to fishing based on this new
information.
Fishing
Initially, in the simulation, the commercial fishers have
knowledge of only one good fishing spot, namely their own cell.
If this cell is blocked by aquaculture, the simulation forces them
to search for a new location that they can fish in. They base
this search on other fishers’ formal and official complaints, but
this information is initially only a guess since it is not their own
knowledge. When they do harvest at the location, they get to
know how good that spot actually is, but if they are sharing with
another fisher they get only half payout, since there already is a
fisher agent that occupies that cell.
Building
This last sequence of events represents the addition of an
aquaculture cell in the simulation that effectively blocks the area
for fishers. Five aquaculture facilities are built every round of the
simulation, at random locations that are reserved for aquaculture
in the original coastal plan and that has not been blocked by
fishers complaints.
Sequence
The sequence then goes as follows (see Figure 4) in the
simulation. First the municipality creates a coastal plan which
contains the areas that are reserved for the aquaculture
industry. In the beginning, all coastal areas are reserved for
aquaculture.
When the plan has been completed, however, it is sent to
all interested agents (including the fishers) for review. Fishers
decide whether to make a complaint and send those formally to
the government, which decides based on the complaints if the
plan needs to be reworked or not. If it needs to be reworked,
it is sent back to the municipality with a list of changes that
need to be applied and the simulation goes back to the coastal
planning phase. During these revisions the municipality converts
aquaculture areas with approved complaints into reserved zones.
If the government decides that the plan is fine, and thereby
disregards complaints, the process continues with the fishing
phase, where the fisher moves to a cell with an already existing
fisher occupies it. If there has been three (3) hearing-planning
cycles already, the simulator is set to automatically approve the
plan based on experiences from the real life process. There are
two fishing phases after plan approval, with the aquaculture
building phase in between them. When the second fishing phase
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FIGURE 4 | Process chart of the simulation.
is complete, a new plan is created by the municipality, and a new
round begins.
In the simulation, agents measure their performance through
priority satisfaction, where agents of different types have different
priorities. Fishermen prioritize their own profits most of all, but
also prioritize the wealth of the community, which directly profits
from aquaculture facilities, and is in line with different workshop
results (Tiller et al., 2014). Fishers learn and thereby change
their decision making based on which strategies are observed
as more successful in the simulation, though. If agents observe
that those that complain more are more successful, they will
copy the strategy which results in the complaints for that agent.
This copying is applied with social learning as an evolutionary
process.
Stakeholder Selection and Workshop
The real life workshop where this was presented and commented
on consisted of 7 representatives of the Norwegian Fishermen’s
Union (Norges Fiskarlag) andwas conducted during the spring of
2014. The stakeholders were selected using the snowball method
through their respective organization. The quality of the results
sampled from this group far outweighs the relative small number,
as is often the case in qualitative research studies where large
samples can be ineffective and do not provide the detailed and
contextual information wanted by the researcher. In a narrative
analysis, which this project included, 15 was judged by the
researcher to be the maximum of what would provide a holistic
narrative where all participants were given ample opportunity to
share, and this limit was given to the supervisor at the company in
charge of selecting participants. The sample size can be as small
as one or two as well, if this participant has information that is
of critical value for that given sector and advances the research
toward a specific goal (Sandelowski, 1995). By prior consent,
the session was recorded, and the narrative from the perception
workshop was used to illuminate the results.
RESULTS
Simulation Results
An important factor of the simulation is that in order for the
fishers to keep aquaculture at bay, they have to cooperate on
complaining. A single fisher complaining will not be able to
consistently reserve any areas since the probability of complaints
being approved is less than 1 and an agent can only complain
once about a given area. However, several agents complaining
about the same area significantly increases the odds of a
complaint about that location being approved. The population
of fishers overall will therefore benefit from cooperation. This is
because complaining has zero monetary cost in the simulation.
However, there is an associated information cost when agents
reveal their good fishing spots by complaining about the
allocation of aquaculture localities in the same spot. This cost is
not an explicit part of the decision making process, but rather a
consequence of complaining, and thus this information sharing
cost is learned through experience as well. Individual fishers are
therefore disadvantaged by complaining since they thereby share
information about the best fishing spot they know of.
When running the simulation for 30 rounds, the outcomes
can be classified in two kinds: a collapse and stabilization
(Figure 5). In the first outcome, the collapse, the average
number of complaints from fishers in each round plummets
and reaches zero (0) almost immediately, which eventually
results in the whole map being flooded with aquaculture
facilities. This outcome is labeled a “collapse.” In the other
outcome, the stabilization, the simulation doesn’t collapse, and
the complaining rate of fishers stabilizes at a non-zero level and
aquaculture expansion stops after a while, resulting in a stable
equilibrium of complaints. According to the specifications of our
simulation, when fishers end up not complaining, it is because
they observe that complaining doesn’t work. The average fisher
fitness is higher in stabilized outcomes than collapsed ones, which
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FIGURE 5 | Average number of complaints for each round of 20
simulations using the same configuration. The three highlighted plots
(red, blue, and green) are of special interest because they have attributes that
distinguish them from the rest. Non-highlighted plots show regular collapsed
and stabilized outcomes. Out of the non-highlighted plots, there are 8
stabilized runs and 9 collapsed ones. The three highlighted runs are all
classified as stabilized ones. The red plot (top highlighted one) shows the only
run where the average number of complaints rapidly falls in the beginning, but
recovers and stabilizes around the same level as the normal stabilized runs.
The green plot also shows a run that falls rapidly and recovers, but the
recovery is at a much lower level. The blue plot shows the lowest stability level
with a normal profile.
means that there are other influences on the outcome than a
pure evolutionary process would optimize. There are stochastic
effects originating from varying degrees in information in the
agents, which can result in the sub-optimal outcome. Fishers have
different knowledge about fishing spots, and when they learn
the value of a spot that information may be false if there is
more than one fisher operating there, which results in reduced
income for them. It was furthermore one of our expectations,
which was also built into the simulation, that the simulated fishers
always complained because if enough fishers complain they can
protect a larger area from aquaculture expansion, which in turn
would protect the income of the fishers. However, sufficient
complaints to protect an area only occur in simulations with a
50% frequency, which is lower than expected.
Stakeholder Workshop Results
When presenting the results from the simulation to fishers
in Frøya during the stakeholder workshop, the main point
of feedback was first that the results of the simulation were
not realistic. They specified that the stakeholder group, in the
simulation called “agent,” the commercial fishers, had in fact
only complained twice to municipal area plans. In these two
cases, aquaculture had in fact been placed on top of fishing
sites. Nevertheless, though they had well-documented reasoning
and put in large efforts in the complaint process, neither
complaint was approved. Eventually, aquaculture companies
obtained permission to establish in the locations.
We then went on to demonstrate this “collapse” outcome
to them in the Agent-Based simulation, visualizing a setting
in which the complaint approval rate was set to zero (0), and
which in turn would therefore result in total collapse and all
that the coastal resources would be blocked by aquaculture
expansion, something which the fishers nodded and agreed to.
We explained that in the simulation, the agent fisher mainly
received revenue from fishing activities, but since they are
community members, they also receive tax benefits indirectly
from aquaculture companies. This was also input that was
derived from the stakeholder workshop held earlier, and which
the fishers themselves had specified (Tiller et al., 2014). Typically
fishermen’s capital therefore showed a slight increase in the
beginning of the simulation, when the number of aquaculture
facilities is increasing. Later it declines when the fishermen
are pushed away from their preferred fishing spots, either by
aquaculture facilities establishing, or by blocked areas as a
consequence of those facilities.
We also explained that “Average fisherman fitness” signified
the evolutionary fitness of each fisherman, averaged over all
fishermen. Fitness is a term from evolutionary algorithms in
computer science, and is a learning mechanism used in the
system. For fishermen, their fitness is calculated as their combined
satisfaction of various priorities, which were set based on the
results from the first set of participatory workshops. The most
important priority for fishermen at that workshop was their own
profits, which was their capital, and what would ensure their
industry to survive. Another priority that was important for
the fitness of the fisherman was community wealth, which was
influenced by aquaculture which gives back to the community
in a variety of forms. This balance often causes fitness to stay
relatively stable, even if fishing spots are disappearing, since
it means effectively that the community will be richer as a
consequence of more aquaculture industry.
One comment from a fisher, when seeing the simulation play
out (Figure 6), was that it was obvious that the commercial fishers
were being pushed out to the edges, slowly but surely, through the
simulation process and that if we were to run the simulation a few
more rounds we would see that the fishers would be completely
pressed out, which indeed was correct. The reason for this, the
fishers argued, was that even if the plans did state that there
could not be aquaculture in a given locality, because there were
fishing activities there, the industry would thenmake a complaint
to the regional government (Fylkeskommunen) and ask for a
dispensation to bypass the municipality plans, which they felt in
all cases were granted. This is in line with stakeholder theory, in
that not only the commercial fishers are stakeholders, but also
the aquaculture industry, and in the case of Frøya, the latter has a
saliency of 6, with the attributes of power, urgency and legitimacy
all demonstrated.
DISCUSSION
Though the fishers had initially proclaimed that the simulation
did not represent real life for them, we suggest that it did, most
specifically with regards to the collapse outcome, with the fishers
being pressed from all angles and in the end losing all their
fishing grounds because of lack of complaints. However, our
assumption in model input, where we specified that it would be
most beneficial to cooperate as a group of fishers, and report all
fishing spots, which would lead to aquaculture not being allowed
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FIGURE 6 | Screenshot of the graphical user interface of FisherSimulation.
on those spots, was wrong. The fishers emphasized at their lack
of action, which they perceived was leading to a real life collapse,
was due to an observation that it did not matter what they did.
They felt that it had no effect, and therefore nobody complained,
and in turn, all areas were taken over by aquaculture. In turn,
they said that the simulation was correct in that they then had to
move to new fishing spots, where there already were fishers. “We
don’t have a choice—we have to look for new spots” they exclaimed.
They explained that it was usually an unwritten rule that the
fishers had their own private fishing areas. If you had been in a
spot for say 10 years, that would be your spot, and others accepted
and respected it by refraining from fishing in those areas. But this
all disappeared if something, like aquaculture, would take over
your own spot.
It wasn’t the threat of having to share your fishing spot with
other fishers that hindered them from complaining though; it
was just the exasperation of knowing that it wouldn’t lead to
anything anyways. Also, they emphasized that Frøya was a small
island community, and that it was easy to be put on the spot
and be the focus of negative attention if they made a complaint
that could negatively affect the aquaculture industry. “We are
friends with those in the aquaculture industry, and we might even
have close relatives that work in the industry” they explained.
It was furthermore tough to get heard, they argued, when they
lived in a municipality that stood to earn a lot of money from
aquaculture localities being allocated in the area plans. This was
in reference to when in June of 2013, the Norwegian Directorate
of Fisheries announced the allocation of 45 new concessions
(licenses) for aquaculture (see Table 1). The new licenses were
divided into three different groups, with separate allocations
within each (20 licenses for the two regions farthest north, Troms
and Finnmark); 15 open licenses with closed bidding rounds and;
10 open licenses). The results of the bidding rounds for the 15
open licenses were that in the prequalified closed bidding group,
was that the 15 highest bids were granted licenses. This essentially
revealed the official market value of the licenses, with the average
bid of these 15 being 56,6 million NOK (approximately USD
8,7 million). One of the big winners in this bidding war was
Salmar, the aquaculture company with extensive operations in
Frøya (Directorate of Fisheries, 2014a). Salmar had 8 of the 15
highest bids, with concession fees totalling 494 million NOK
(approximately USD 76). Of this total concession fee for Salmar
alone, NOK 86 million (USD 13 million) will be transferred to
the host municipalities for the first time, based on where the
localities for the concessions are allocated. It is expected that
Frøya municipality will receive NOK 16,13 million (USD 2,5
million) as compensation for setting aside ocean space for these
operations (Rønningen, 2014).
The fishers still emphasized though, at the same time, that
they saw the benefits of aquaculture for their community as well,
which echoed the first workshop results as well. The standard
of living had been raised and infrastructure was better, and it
was good for schools and retirement homes, they argued - but
there should be room for more actors as well, they said. “Us
as fishermen don’t get anything directly back from this, but as
inhabitants of Frøya, we do,” they said. They felt that they could
have taken care of the commercial fishermen as well, though, and
not just the aquaculture industry.
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CONCLUSION
In the current article, we have explored what steers the will of the
fishers to provide coastal planners with important information
regarding the location of their fishing areas for the purposes of
adding these to the official area plans. In one case, we expected
fishers to either over-report areas of great fishing, in order to
obtain more zones that would prohibit aquaculture facilities in
the proximity of their fishing spots. In another case, we expected
them to under-report it, as revealing these fishing spots could
encourage other fishers to also encroach on their area, which
might have been a long kept family secret. Our goal was to
test to see whether the coastal planning process and hearings
regarding the industry application for localities would conform
to the Norwegian system of inclusion of stakeholders and their
resultant trust in the governance process. The Fishermen’s Union
is relatively large in membership, and is incorporated into the
process of forming policy through tripartite conversation. This
means that policy often is made in concert between the executive
branch of government, peak business that are often dominated by
large export-oriented firms (such as the aquaculture industry in
this case), as well as labor federations such as stakeholders groups
for fishermen (Lijphart, 1999; Siaroff, 1999; Dryzek et al., 2003).
In looking at the planning and building act (Lovdata.no,
2008) and the official documents that prescribe the planning
process, as well as the localities process, we find that this on
paper is correct in this setting, which was also reflected in
the simulation developed for the purposes of this study. The
simulator was created to replicate the complaint behaviors related
to the municipal area planning process of this given set of
stakeholders; or if it weren’t able to replicate them, reveal why the
simulated situation didn’t correspond to real life. The simulations
provided two results that were occurring at an equal rate. One
was the “collapse” outcome, with no complaints being filed
and aquaculture taking over the area. The other was one of
stabilization, where expansion of aquaculture stops after a while.
The fishers, that were the stakeholders investigated in this case
to comment upon their own “agents” in the simulation, were
in agreement that the simulation outcome “collapse” indeed
was what they were experiencing in real life, in that they had
stopped making complaints after experiencing that there was
no effect to it, and that the aquaculture industry was more
powerful than them in determining policy in not only their
municipality but also in the region as a whole. Though Norway
is a stakeholder inclusive state, attempting to anticipate and
organize stakeholders into the state itself (Dryzek et al., 2003),
this is not contrary to the experiences of the fishers despite their
lack of influence on the system to steer it in their benefit. This is
because, when one applies stakeholder theory to this experience,
one sees that the aquaculture industry is also a stakeholder in
this process. As such, we know that stakeholders can be classified
according to their possession of one, two, or all three of the main
identifying attributes of their group with regards to their level of
power, legitimacy and the urgency of their claim. Power relates to
a given stakeholder’s ability to influence the process in question,
or the decisionmaker sector, which in this case is the allocation of
marine areas or the actual allocation of localities after the licenses
have been granted. Legitimacy refers to the given stakeholder
groups relationship with the governing sector in question and
Urgency refers to the claim the given stakeholder is putting forth,
and the degree to which it calls for its immediate attention
because it is time-sensitive and of importance to the given
stakeholder. When two stakeholders are on opposite sides of a
process and both attempt to influence the system, the saliency,
or number of attributes it possesses, is instrumental. In the
case of the stakeholders commercial fishers and the aquaculture
industry, we find that the former are Dependent stakeholders,
by possessing both legitimacy and urgency, but do not have
the power. The aquaculture industry, however, especially in the
case of Frøya, is an Important Stakeholder by possessing all
three attributes on his own, and is a force that decision makers
will always consider, having urgency, power and legitimacy.
However, we also expect that in other areas in Norway, other
stakeholder groups will have this attribute, with the aquaculture
industry playing the role of the dependent stakeholder. In the
end, however, it is the national government, working alongside
both interest groups that will determine who gets what and how
much of the resource that marine area in fact is.
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